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PERSONAL NARRATIVES AND RACIAL
DISTINCTIVENESS IN THE LEGAL ACADEMY
The Alchemy of Race and Rights. By Patricia J. Williams.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1991. Pp. 263. $24.95.
Reviewed by Maria O'Brien Hylton*
INTRODUCTION
A small group of legal academicians is embroiled in yet another
debate that, to the uninitiated at least, appears to have little or
nothing to do with "the law." 1 This time the issue is the ideology of
legal writing style-that is, does a growing, unique body of legal
scholarship that draws on the personal experiences of minority
faculty and, arguably, reflects the racial oppression these scholars
have suffered, produce "distinct normative insights?" 2 Professor Pa-
tricia Williams of the University of Wisconsin clearly believes that
it does.
In her new book, The Alchemy of Race and Rights,3 which is
essentially a collection of twelve essays described in the jacket as
"autobiographical," she discusses an extraordinarily wide range of
subjects, including student evaluations, antisemitism, maternity
leave, and the Howard Beach incident. The essays are united by
Williams' conscious attempt to distance herself from traditional le-
gal scholarship as she discusses the many ways in which race, class,
and sometimes gender intersect and affect an almost bewildering
* Associate Professor of Law, DePaul University. A.B., Harvard, 1982; J.D., Yale, 1985. For
helpful comments with earlier drafts of this review I thank Jacob Corre, Linda Crane, Keith N.
Hylton, Tracey Maclin, Glenn Reynolds, and Jane Rutherford. Rein Krammer assisted with the
research, and the Dean's Research Fund of the DePaul College of Law provided generous support.
All of the usual disclaimers as to error and opinion apply.
I. i use this phrase here in the way that many of my first-year students do-to refer with
almost worshipful respect to the rules, statutes, and other clear-cut statements about what is and
is not "legal" that are commonly found in the study aids law students use to prepare for
examinations.
2. See, e.g.. Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324-26 (1987) (suggesting that "the actual experience, history,
culture, and the intellectual tradition of people of color" provide a source of knowledge for
scholars).
3. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
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variety of issues. She states at the outset that her work is an "inten-
tional departure"4  from a "traditionally legal black-letter[]
vocabulary." 5
She explains:
I am trying to create a genre of legal writing to fill the gaps of traditional
legal scholarship. I would like to write in a way that reveals the intersubjec-
tivity of legal constructions, that forces the reader both to participate in the
construction of meaning and to be conscious of that process.'
Thus, one must evaluate Williams' work both in terms of this new
style and, of course, in terms of the substantive positions she takes
on the various problems she tackles. I consider first the question of
style.
I. SPEAKING WITH A UNIQUE VOICE MEANS SPEAKING
ONLY FOR ONESELF
The effectiveness of the stylistic task Professor Williams has set
for herself-writing in a new and highly personal way about legal
problems-is hindered by a writing style that is at times extremely
abstract and multireferential. While her anecdotes and stories do
indeed "highlight[] factors that would otherwise go unremarked," 7
one is sometimes forced to read and reread certain passages in order
to grasp her meaning. For example, in spite of her stated desire to
get away from "insights [that] have been buried in relatively arcane
vocabulary and abstraction" 8 she states:
The propagated mask of the imagined literary critic, the language club of
hyperauthenticity, the myth of a purely objective perspective, the godlike
image of generalized, legitimating others-these are too often reified in law
as "impersonal" rules and "neutral" principles, presumed to be inanimate,
unemotional, unbiased, unmanipulated, and higher than ourselves.9
The fundamental isolationism of individual preference as an arbiter is
quite different from the "neutrality," the "blindness," and the "impersonal-
ity" used' to justify the collectivized convenience of standardized
preference. 10
4. Id. at 7.
5. Id. at 6.
6. Id. at 7-8.
7. Id. at 7.
8. Id. at 6.
9. Id. at 11.
10. Id. at 102.
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Breaking out of this, they say, is something we all suffer as pawns in a
hierarchy, but it is particularly aggravated in the confusing, oxymoronic hi-
erarchic symbology of me as black female law professor.'
S. as "transsexual," S. as "not homosexual," thus became a mere floating
signifier, a deconstructive polymorph par excellence. 2
Who, one may well wonder, does Williams imagine her intended
audience to be? However, in spite of the occasional failure to keep
in mind her own professed dislike of arcane language, Professor
Williams' personal narrative is generally interesting and, I think,
does contribute to the reader's appreciation of Williams' life and
experiences. Certainly, to the extent that the debate about the per-
sonal work of certain minority scholars is simply about "voice, about
making everybody speak one language," as Professor Richard Del-
gado has suggested,'" it is hard to argue with Williams' approach.
On the contrary, it is positively helpful to know something about her
experiences and biases as one tries to evaluate her substantive
positions.
The debate, however, about a "unique" minority scholarship" has
not been limited simply to the desirability of more diversity in legal
scholarship. On the contrary, Professor Mari Matsuda and others 5
II. Id. at 97.
12. Id. at 123.
13. Jon Wiener, Law Profs Fight the Power, THE NATION, Sept. 4/11, 1989, at 246, 248.
Delgado stated: "Certain cries of pain lose a lot in the translation. The whole idea of the dominant
legal discourse is to limit the range of what you can express, the range of argument you can make.
It requires that everything be butressed by authority, by looking to the past." Id.
14. It is important to note that there exist so-called minority legal scholars who, for any num-
ber of presumed reasons, do not produce the kind of personal, experiential work that Williams,
Delgado, and others champion. In addition to myself, the following come to mind: Robert Belton,
Causation and Burden-Shifting Doctrines in Employment Discrimination Law Revisited: Some
Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1359 (1990); Stephen L. Carter, Consti-
tutional Improprieties: Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison and Administrative Government, 57 U.
CHI. L. REv. 357 (1990); Pat K. Chew, Competing Interests in the Corporate Opportunity Doc-
trine, 67 N.C. L. REv. 435 (1989); Keith N. Hylton, Costly Litigation and Legal Error Under
Negligence, 6 J.L. EcON. & ORGANIZATION 433 (1990); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Racial Critiques
of Legal Academia: A Reply in Favor of Context, 43 STAN. L. REv. 137 (1990); Randall L.
Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 122 HARv. L. REV. 1745 (1989); Harold Honju
Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra
Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255 (1988); Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative
Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 111 (1990).
15. See Matsuda, supra note 2, at 324; Derrick A. Bell, A Question of Credentials, HARV. L.
REC., Sept. 17, 1982, at 14; Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and
Teaching: Finding the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539 (1991); Richard Delgado,
The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
561, 566-73 (1984).
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have argued that because of their race and their unique, racially
influenced perspective, minority scholars doing the kind of work that
one finds in Alchemy speak with "a special voice to which we should
listen."1 6 Williams, though, does not make this claim for herself in
any of the twelve essays. She does, however, hint (unwittingly, I
think) at a fundamental problem implicit in her own personalist ap-
proach. In her first essay, "The Brass Ring and the Deep Blue Sea,"
she relates a story she uses "to illustrate the rhetoric of power rela-
tions" 17 to her students. The story involves a couple walking down
Fifth Avenue in New York with their young son who is explaining
that he is afraid of big dogs. The parents ask him why he is afraid
of big dogs and he says, "Because they're big."'" The parents then
go on to explain to the little boy that there is no difference between
a big, menacing dog and a little Pekinese. "They're all just dogs,"' 9
his father says.
Williams explains that she uses this story in class to
illustrate[] a paradigm of thought by which children are taught not to see
what they see; by which blacks are reassured that there is no real inequality
in the world, just their own bad dreams. . . . The story also illustrates the
possibility of a collective perspective or social positioning that would give
rise to a claim for the legal interests of groups. In a historical moment when
individual rights have become the basis for any remedy, too often group
interests are defeated by, for example, finding the one four-year-old who has
wrestled whole packs of wolfhounds fearlessly to the ground; using that indi-
vidual experience to attack the validity of there ever being any generalizable
four-year-old fear of wolfhounds; and then recasting the general group expe-
rience as a fragmented series of specific, isolated events rather than a perva-
sive social phenomenon ("You have every right to think that that wolfhound
has the ability to bite off your head, but that's just your point of view").20
16. See Matsuda, supra note 2, at 324. For an excellent discussion of the importance of appre-
ciating the experience of others (what Charles Black has called "the humane imagination"), see
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR.. THE HUMANE IMAGINATION 6 (1986). Black writes:
[Rlacism, our bitter curse, has many roots and manifestations. One of the chiefest
roots and, in turn, manifestations, has been the blank failure of white people to imag-
ine black people anywhere near rightly. A more correct imagination of the inner life
of black people, living in an insultingly racist regime, might not at once have brought
much change; evil can remain evil, even when it can no longer say with a straight face
that it knows not what it does. But it is at least possible that a shift toward humane-
ness might have started sooner had the humane imagination sooner been put to work
on this problem in more minds.
Id.
17. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 12.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 13.
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What Professor Williams does not address is how one ought to
deal with the existence of the wrestling, fearless four-year-old. Are
his story and experience any less valid than those of the little boy
who remains afraid? How is one to decide? If the brave boy's expe-
rience is also real, what are its implications for the legal interests of
the rest of the group? 21 Do we not have to assume (or at least inves-
tigate whether) the "collective perspective" may, in fact, consist of
nothing more than a hodgepodge of differing encounters with wolf-
hounds'? Herein lies a basic problem with legal scholarship that
comes to conclusions based, even in part, upon personal experience.
It is hard to know whether the experience being related is typical of
the group or simply an outlier,22 like that of the fearless, dog-wres-
tling child. So few legal scholars feel obliged to do anything more
than assert their views 3 (with or without the aura of "objectivity")
that I am loathe to criticize Williams for the same sin. However,
reading page after page of assertions about the experiences of
blacks, buttressed by nothing more than personal anecdotes (or
those of friends and colleagues), leaves the reader hungry for a sim-
ple statistic or two, or a reference to the work of, say, a Professor
William Julius Wilson, the eminent sociologist.2,4
In the end, Williams does not accomplish the first task she set for
herself-the creation of a useful, stylistically unique method for ex-
amining legal problems. Her failure to execute, though, does not
necessarily mean that the enterprise has no validity. It just makes
finding an appropriate application a bit tougher.
21. The controversy over the significance and effect of Justice Clarence Thomas' impoverished
background and experiences of racial discrimination are a fine example of this problem. See, e.g.,
Haywood Burns, Clarence Thomas, a Counterfeit Hero, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1991, at A19 ("But
Judge Thomas is no role model for poor youth. If he has 'made it,' he has at the expense of
betraying those from whom he has come. He has appropriated the values and philosophy of those
responsible for the vertical relationship of white over black, rich over poor .... "); see also
Dinesh D'Souza, Clarence Thomas on Law, Rights and Morality, WALL ST. J., July 2, 1991, at
A10 ("'I have felt the pain of racism as much as anyone else . . . [y]et I am wild about the
Constitution and about the Declaration . . . . I believe in the American proposition, the Ameri-
can dream, because I've seen it in my own life.' " (quoting then-Judge Thomas)).
22. Vic BARNETT & Tony LEWIS, OUTLIERS IN STATISTICAL DATA 4 (1978) (defining an out-
lier as "an observation . . . which appears to be inconsistent with the remainder of that set of
data" which "may frustrate . . . attempts to draw inferences about that population").
23. A notable exception is, for example, JULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION
ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY (1976). See also John J. Donohue Ill, Prohibiting Sex Discrimi-
nation in the Workplace: An Economic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1337 (1989) (utilizing
surveys and statistical data to support his positions).
24. See WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987); WILLIAM J. WILSON. THE
DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE (2d ed. 1980).
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II. DISCRIMINATION IN BRAZIL, NASTY STUDENTS, AND
ABORTION: BUT, WHAT To Do?
Substantively, Williams' discussion of various problems, from
homelessness to obnoxious law students, varies widely in quality. For
example, her essay "Teleology on the Rocks" includes a very
thoughtful analysis of the Howard Beach incident, in which a black
man was killed when he was struck by a car as he fled from a group
of white youths who were beating him and his companions. She re-
views the positions staked out by the various players as the New
York drama unfolded. In particular her analysis of the behavior of
the public officials in question, specifically then-Mayor Ed Koch,
makes clear what more recent incidents2" and the film maker Spike
Lee26 have also demonstrated: An irrationally intense sense of
neighborhood boundaries, fostered by certain public officials, tends
to shift guilt from the assailants to the victims by asking the ques-
tion, "What were they doing there anyway?"
Williams notes that when Koch asked a group of churchgoers in
Jamaica, Queens, a predominantly black neighborhood, to try to ap-
preciate why the residents of Howard Beach were unhappy about an
interracial march through their neighborhood, "[h]e asked them
how they would feel if fourteen hundred white people took to [their]
streets."'27 Williams is on target when she explains why Koch's ques-
tion is so offensive:
This question, from the chief executive of New York City's laws, accepts a
remarkable degree of possessiveness about public streets-possessiveness,
furthermore, that is racially and not geographically bounded. Koch was, in
effect, pleading for acceptance of the privatization of public space. This is
the de facto equivalent of segregation; it is exclusion in the guise of deep-
moated property "interests" and "values." Lost is the fact that the object of
discussion, the street, is public."
In addition to the excellent Howard Beach discussion, several of
Williams' anecdotes about her teaching experiences ring very true,
25. See Sarah Lyall, Atlantic Beach Struggles To Explain Attack on Black Youth, N.Y.
TIMES, June 7, 1991, at BI (four white men charged with attempted murder); Craig Wolff, Three
Arrested in Beating of Black, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1991, at BI (black youth beaten by white
youths).
26. JUNGLE FEVER (Universal City Studios 1991) (in which the director explicitly takes the
position that racial incidents like Howard Beach and the murder of Yusef Hawkins (to whom the
film is dedicated) occur because of interracial disputes about turf and sexual mythology).
27. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 69.
28. Id.
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although I do not know whether this was due to the fact that she
and I are among the small handful of black female law professors29
or whether, as I strongly suspect, these stories will resonate with a
great many of our white male (and female) colleagues as well. In
either case, several of her anecdotes about teaching reminded me of
uncannily similar experiences (which I wrote off as "outliers"). In
"Gilded Lilies and Liberal Guilt," she recites the truisms that her
students trot out whenever she tries to discuss economic rights and
poverty with them. She writes: "[They tell me] 'I know a black fam-
ily and they're making it'; 'My grandfather came to this country
with nothing,' " and so forth.30
Williams' attempts to raise these questions in her classes lead, in-
evitably it seems, to complaints by the students-both directly to
her Dean and in the form of anonymous written evaluations. Many
professors will, I think, sympathize with her dismay at students
who, for no apparent reason, comment on her clothing and her hair-
style in assessing her class. 1 (As I read this, I cannot help but
glance over at my own most recent evaluations; the one on the top of
the stack says "Please DO NOT get pregnant and have a baby dur-
ing the middle of the semester" in the section devoted to ways in
which the professor could improve the class. That is one of the
kinder ones.)
Finally, several nasty antisemitic incidents she describes are pow-
erful and moving. While some readers may find these stories harder
to identify with, again, I found myself nodding as she describes how
unpleasant and paralyzing it can be when people are "so open about
their antisemitism."' 2 (Indeed, they reminded me of a recent phone
29. See Compilation of Responses from 175 A.B.A. Approved Law Schools in the United
States, Table B-6: Minority Women Faculty Teaching Members 1990-91, A.B.A. Sec. of Legal
Educ. and Admissions to the Bar (March 25, 1991) (121 faculty members were full-time, black,
and not of hispanic origin); see also A Review of Legal Education in the United States-Fall
1990-Law Schools and Bar Admission Requirements, A.B.A. Sec. of Legal Educ. and Admis-
sion to the Bar 66 (1991) (according to the responses, there are approximately 5366 faculty teach-
ing members). Thus, 2.3% of faculty teaching members were full-time, black, and not of hispanic
origin.
30. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 28.
31. Id. at 95. For an intelligent and engaging discussion of the ways in which law school stu-
dent evaluations are subject to error and bias, see Richard L. Abel, Evaluating Evaluations: How
Should Law Schools Judge Teaching?, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 407 (1990). Abel notes that "[student]
[slatisfaction is not synonymous with quality." Id. at 418. He also states that "[tihe very behavior
that is praised in scholarship as original, bold, or provocative frequently leads to negative evalua-
tions of teaching." Id. at 452.
32. WILLIAMS. supra note 3, at 127.
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call I received from a colleague of mine at another institution who
wanted to discuss how to deal with a student in a seminar who re-
ferred to a section of Chicago as "Jew Town" and suggested that
good bargains could be had there.)
Ultimately, though, a great many of the questions Williams raises
via the device of personal anecdote and reflection are unsatisfactory
because she does no more than identify a problem and indicate her
displeasure with the status quo. This would not be so vexing if she
gave some indication that she understood the tremendous complex-
ity of some of the social phenomena she describes. But this is not
the case. In one essay, for example, she explains that new legislation
in Brazil, which requires employers to grant pregnant women four
months of maternity leave, is triggering requests for proof of sterili-
zation from prospective female employees by employers. Williams
disapproves of this response to the legislation, but she does no more
than condemn the "brutal directness of such bargains."33 She makes
no effort to assess the desirability of this kind of mandated benefit,
or to propose an alternative solution." ' The simple truth is that man-
dated benefits can have disastrous consequences for poor women; the
hard question is whether the state ought to mandate such a benefit
in spite of the "brutal" bargains it may engender. Williams' analysis
is of no help here. She is critical, but aside from identifying the
issue she apparently feels no obligation to contribute to its
resolution.
Williams also writes about the wages of child care workers in the
same vein. She describes black female help in New York City as
"grossly underpaid .'"3 She hastily characterizes these employee-em-
ployer relationships as "exploitation ' 3 6 in a way that leaves the
reader wondering whether she is even remotely familiar with the
work of her own colleagues about the creation of markets. 7
33. Id. at 32.
34. For a discussion of mandated benefits generally and parental leave in particular, see Maria
O'Brien Hylton, 'Parental' Leaves and Poor Women: Paying the Price for Time Off, 52 U. PITT.
L. REV. 475 (1991).
35. WILLIAMS. supra note 3, at 20.
36. Id.
37. There is, for example, the work of Professor Palay of the University of Wisconsin. Thomas
M. Palay, A Contract Does Not a Contract Make, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 561; see also Donohue,
supra note 23; Douglas L. Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REv, 353 (1984); Richard A.
Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988 (1984); Michael L. Wachter &
George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics of Collective Bargaining: An Introduction and Appli-
cation to the Problems of Subcontracting, Partial Closure, and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. RFv.
1414 [Vol. 41:1407
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The explanation for this unfortunate treatment of a complex sub-
ject lies, I think, in her essay entitled "On Being the Object of Prop-
erty." There, Professor Williams says "[m]arket theory always
takes attention away from the full range of human potential in its
pursuit of a divinely willed, rationally inspired, invisibly handed eco-
nomic actor."3 "Divinely willed?" You may well wonder what she
is talking about; whose work is she referring to? Unfortunately, her
disdain for "market theory" (read "economics generally," I think) is
so pervasive that she was unable to bring herself to cite a single
source to support this assertion. Instead, she says, "The experiential
blinders of market actor and slaver go in different directions, yet the
partializing ideologies of each makes the act of not-seeing an un-
socializing, if unconscious, component of seeing." 39 Hmmm . . .
OK.
As for topics that Professor Williams purports to treat in a per-
sonal way, such as adoption and abortion, the result is equally un-
satisfying in that she refuses to retreat from her now-standard
formula of identify, criticize, and move on. She tells the reader that
she has no children of her own 40 and does not feel compelled "to
have children just because engineering social statisticians say I am
'better able' to parent than the vast majority of black women who,
being lower-class, are purportedly 'least able' to parent." ' Defen-
sive? I think so. Who would want to force her to have children just
because she is middle-class? I think she reveals the source of some
of her discomfort when she wonders why she has not tried to adopt
one of the many "black and brown children who languish in institu-
tional abandon."42 Here, I very much wanted to know the answer to
the question she has raised, but she quickly moves on to another
topic. At this point, the reader who has accepted her "new genre" of
legal writing in the hope that she will reveal something truly per-
sonal and grapple honestly with problems like adoption is bound to
be very disappointed.
Her treatment of the relationship between a woman and a fetus is
even more peculiar and unsatisfying:
1349 (1988).
38. WILLIAMS. supra note 3, at 220.
39. Id. at 220-21.
40. Id. at 195.
41. Id.
42. Id.
19921 1415
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I don't believe that a fetus is a separate person from the moment of concep-
tion; how could it be? It is interconnected, flesh-and-blood-bonded, com-
pletely a part of a woman's body. Why try to carve one from the other?
Why is there no state interest in not simply providing for but improving the
circumstances of the woman, whether pregnant or not?'
Why try to carve one from the other? (This is a serious ques-
tion?) And then: "I'm not sure I believe that a child who has left
the womb is really a separate person until sometime after the age of
two."" What does this mean? Is she joking, or is she making a
cryptic suggestion about abortion rights? Who has argued that the
fetus is a "separate person" from the moment of conception?45 The
reader who thought that the endless pro-choice/pro-life bickering
was really about when life begins and on the alleged importance of
complete female bodily autonomy will find Williams' treatment here
at once self-righteous and confusing."'
Just what is Williams' position on abortion? Why has she consid-
ered (and rejected) the possibility of adopting a needy black child?
Expectations to the contrary, her anecdotal writing style does not
reveal much truly personal information, especially with respect to
some of the toughest personal questions: lifestyle and procreative
choice.
III. CONCLUSION
In spite of all the hoopla about the anecdotal work of certain mi-
nority scholars,' 7 the stylistic diversity that Williams and others are
struggling-to bring into the legal academy cannot possibly do too
43. Id. at 184.
44. Id.
45. The preamble to Missouri's constitution does state, however, that life begins at conception.
46. For a good summary of pro-choice and pro-life views, see Laurence H. Tribe, Will the
Abortion Fight Ever End? A Nation Held Hostage, N.Y. TiMES, July 2, 1990, at AI5. Tribe
relates the pro-choice argument as follows: "[Fiorcing a woman to remain pregnant and become a
mother is a grave assault. To conscript a woman to carry a fetus to term within her, to force upon
her the physical and psychological bonds of motherhood, is a unique and most fundamental inva-
sion of her constitutional liberty." Id. The pro-life argument is: "The fetus is alive. It belongs to
the human species. It elicits sympathy and even love, in part because it is so dependent and
helpless. . . . [A] human fetus deserves protection." Id.
47. See Milner S. Ball, The Legal Acadamy and Minority Scholars, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1855
(1990); Robin D. Barnes, Race Consciousness: The Thematic Content of Racial Distinctiveness in
Critical Race Scholarship, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1864 (1990); Scott Brewer, Introduction: Choosing
Sides in the Racial Critiques Debate, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1844 (1990); Richard Delgado, Mindset
and Metaphor, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1872 (1990); Leslie G. Espinoza, Masks and Other Disguises:
Exposing Legal Academia, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1878 (1990); Kennedy, supra note 14; Matsuda,
supra note 2; Wiener, supra note 13.
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much harm and may even do some good. Certainly the promise of
increased accessibility/sensitivity that the personal narrative method
brings with it remains an attractive goal. The single biggest draw-
back to Alchemy, however, has nothing to do with the new genre
Williams believes she is developing, but with an astonishing refusal
to follow through and share truly personal, distinctive information
about her life as a black female law professor. While many of her
stories about the academy are consistent with my own experiences,
she does not make good on her promise to "fill the gaps of tradi-
tional legal scholarship" 48 with respect to many important sociolegal
questions like abortion. Indeed, in her section on abortion, Williams
reveals less about her substantive views than some so-called tradi-
tional scholars.49
Of course, for other minority scholars in the legal academy, her
stories about treatment at the hands of students and racism in the
academy will come as something of a relief because, I think, they
will lessen the excruciating sense of isolation so many experience.
Reading Professor Williams' work is a good reminder not only that
there are African-American women law teachers, but also that in
spite of ridiculously low numbers they are doing legal scholarship on
their own terms and taking a few chances along the way. One only
wishes that, besides breaking stylistic ground, Williams would have
taken a few more substantive chances and committed herself on the
really hard issues.
48. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 7.
49. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1354-59 (2d ed. 1988)
(expounding the author's pro-choice views on abortion).
14171992]
